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We develop a theory for long-distance quantum key distribution based on concatenated entan-
glement swapping using parametric down-conversion sources and show numerical results of our
model. The model incorporates practical resources including multi-pair sources, inefficient detec-
tors with dark counts and lossy channels. We calculate the maximum secret key-generation rate
for up to three entanglement swapping stations by optimizing over resource parameters, and our
numerical simulation shows that the range of quantum key distribution can in principle be markedly
increased but at the expense of an atrociously unfeasible secret key-generation rate; however, the
upper bound of our key rates closely approach the Takeoka-Guha-Wilde upper bound. Our analysis
demonstrates the need for new technology such as quantum memory to synchronize photons and
our methods should serve as a valuable component for accurately modelling quantum-memory-based
long-distance quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication over public channels is vital for
enabling effectively private information transfer. Two
steps are involved: establishing a key and then using the
key for encryption and decryption [1]. The security of ex-
isting approaches to constructing a shared key between
two parties relies on the computational complexity of the
secret-key-generation algorithm, but this security would
be compromised if fast decryption algorithm were discov-
ered (unlikely but not provably forbidden) or if a scalable
quantum computer were available. Quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) aims to provide information-theoretic se-
curity, in other words to create keys that are safe against
computational attacks [2].
One key challenge for QKD is to reach long dis-
tances, which practically means extending beyond hun-
dreds of kilometres with a good secret key-generation rate
(SKGR) (better than kilobits per second) and low error
rates, with less than 11% to be corrected by one way
classical communication [3]. Two distinct approaches
to QKD exist: one protocol relies on one party send-
ing qubits to the other, exemplified by the 1984 Bennett-
Brassard (BB84) protocol [4], and the other based on the
two parties sharing and reconciling an entangled state ex-
emplified by the 1991 Ekert (E91) [5] and 1992 Bennett-
Brassard-Mermin (BBM92) [6] protocols.
The BBM92 protocol is particularly amenable to the
quantum relay method [7], which relies on entangle-
ment swapping (ES) [8] to extend the distance QKD can
reach [2]. Our theory treats practical QKD, where the
term “practical” refers to the theory accommodating the
reality of photon sources and detectors including multi-
photon events, dark counts and losses [9, 10].
Here we study the reach of practical quantum-relay-
based long-distance QKD using a theory that treats pho-
ton sources, communication channels and detectors real-
istically. Our model shows that QKD could reach over
800 km in principle but at atrociously bad SKGR. An
important result of our theory is the underscoring of the
need for quantum memory [11, 12] to synchronize pho-
tons so that the poor rates obtained from our analysis
can be beaten, and our model will prove valuable as a
component of a full, accurate model that incorporates
realistic quantum memory in order to assess the reach of
quantum-repeater-based QKD [13] .
We develop our model of long-distance QKD by ex-
tending an existing practical protocol that modifies the
BBM92 protocol using ES. This practical protocol, which
is based on parametric down conversion (PDC) sources is
given the acronym PDC-ES-BBM92 [14]. Our modifica-
tion here extends PDC-ES-BBM92, which we call PDC-
CES-BBM92, to the case of multiple ES stations by em-
ploying concatenated ES, or CES for short. The earlier
protocol PDC-ES-BBM92 is a special case of PDC-CES-
BBM92 corresponding to having a single ES station. This
special case corresponds to non-relay setup, with which
we will compare our relay setups.
If a source were capable of producing a train of ideal
Fourier-limited single photons [15], the BBM92 protocol
would straightforwardly accommodate multiple repeater
stations. For practical QKD, which accounts for im-
perfect sources and detectors, the protocol for sender A
and receiver B must dictate actions for cases that higher
2counts are received as described in the PDC-ES-BBM92
protocol. The security of PDC-ES-BBM92 is assured
through squashing, with squashing referring to the effec-
tive projection of the protocol’s Hilbert space to smaller
dimension through the measurements conducted by A
and B [16, 17].
For N = 3 ES stations, we show that our model pre-
dicts a secure communication distance of up to 850 km.
Unfortunately the rate becomes unimaginably low: even
at zero separation between A and B, and simply taking
into account just the device losses and the coincidence
probability for the various PDC sources, one bit would
be generated every 150 billion years, which is approxi-
mately ten times the presumed age of the universe. Hav-
ing A and B move far apart makes the rate even worse
due to channel losses between PDC-based ES stations.
The pessimistic predictions of our model do not negate
the value of having a realistic ES-based QKD descrip-
tion; rather such a model is needed as a foundation for
accurate descriptions of ultimately feasible long-distance
QKD.
As our protocol performs badly with respect to SKGR,
we evaluate how well PDC-CES-BBM92 performs with
respect to the Takeoka-Guha-Wilde (TGW) bound for
SKGR [18]. We Thus, determine the SKGR consider-
ing ideal single-photon sources and unit-efficiency zero-
dark-count detectors thereby ensuring that our protocol
is limited only by channel loss and concatenations. The
resultant idealized SKGR for our protocol is only slightly
below the TGW bound, which depends solely on channel
loss regardless of optical power. Thus, our protocol is
reaching close to an bound for protocols that do not use
quantum repeaters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly
explain the resources used in entanglement-based proto-
cols. We provide a brief account of BBM92 and PDC-
ES-BBM92 protocols and SKGR associated with these
protocols, and we discuss the SKGR TGW upper bound
for non-repeater-based QKD protocols. In Sec. III, we
describe in detail the protocol for evaluating visibility.
In Sec. IV, we explicate how the quantum-bit-error
rate (QBER) and the key rate are calculated. We de-
termine optimal parameter choices for maximizing the
SKGR, and provide these optimal resource parameters
in Sec. V. We present and plot our results for N = 2
and N = 3 stations for PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol. We
compare our PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol with the decoy-
state protocol, and we find the SKGR upper bound for
our protocol and compare it with TGW bound. Finally,
we conclude in Sec. VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a background on the
imperfections of the optical resources as well as de-
scribing existing entanglement-based protocols on which
our PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol is based. Specifically
these protocols comprise the BBM92 protocol and the
PDC-ES-BBM92 protocol, which are special cases of
our new protocol. We also provide a brief account of
the measurement-device-independent decoy-state proto-
col, which extends furthest among the protocols studied
Thus, far. Finally we assess the TGW bound applicable
for any QKD protocol not using quantum repeaters.
We consider PDC sources with photon-pair production
rate χ2. The state of each PDC source can be represented
by the pure state
|χ〉 = exp
[
iχ
(
aˆ†Hbˆ
†
H + aˆ
†
Vbˆ
†
V + hc
)]
(1)
with aˆ and bˆ the annihilation operators for the two spatial
modes with two polarizations {H,V }, and hc denoting
Hermitian conjugate.
We consider threshold detectors with efficiency η and
dark-count probability ℘. Highly-efficient detectors are
desirable for long-distance QKD, but, in practice, effi-
ciency is traded against increasing dark counts. For com-
monly used InGaAs detectors this trade off is
℘ = AeBη, (2)
with typical values [7]
A = 6.1× 10−7, B = 17. (3)
A more efficient detector will, in turn, have a higher dark-
count rate.
Ineficiency accounting for detector inefficiency η plus
channel losses is
10−(αℓ+α0)/10η (4)
for ℓ the length of channel between the source, and the
detector. The loss coefficient is α, which is given in units
of dB/km, and a fixed loss parameter α0 incorporates all
other distance-independent losses.
For the BBM92 protocol [6] based on perfect resources,
the two legitimate users (sender A and receiver B) share
an entangled pair of qubits. They measure the states of
their own qubit in one of two bases, chosen randomly.
Subsequently A and B reconcile a posteriori their data
strings by selecting those cases for which basis choices
were identical. Ultimately they obtain a shared set of
random numbers from which they build a key, and they
use privacy amplification to ensure that messages can be
sent securely from A to B.
The ES-BBM92 protocol modifies the BBM92 protocol
by using entanglement swapping to distribute entangle-
ment between two users who have never interacted. Each
of the two legitimate users have a source producing an
entangled pair of photons in two modes. A Bell state
measurement (BSM) is performed on two modes, with
one mode emanating from each of the two-mode sources.
A singlet state is post-selected after the BSM. The sin-
glet state is just one of the four Bell states
|Ψ±〉 := |00〉 ± |11〉√
2
, |Φ±〉 := |01〉 ± |10〉)√
2
(5)
3(with |0〉 and |1〉 the logical qubit in the off and on
states, respectively). The ideal singlet measurement cor-
responds to the projector |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|. If the initial source
is a perfect single-pair source, then the post-selection at
the BSM projects the state of the remaining two modes
into a singlet state. Since the two users now share entan-
gled state, BBM92 protocol can be applied.
In the realistic scenario of PDC-ES-BBM92 [14], PDC
sources are used and the detectors and channels have im-
perfections discussed above. The extent of entanglement
shared between the two users is quantified by measuring
the visibility V of multi-photon coincidences between the
two legitimate users.
As the measurement-device-independent decoy-state
protocol [19, 20] has Thus, far the maximum reported
achievable distance, we compare the distance achieved
by our PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol with that achieved
by the measurement-device-independent decoy-state pro-
tocol, which is a variant of the earlier decoy-state proto-
col [10]. In the decoy-state protocol, decoy pulses supple-
ment signal pulses to detect adversarial attacks. In the
measurement-device-independent protocol, signal pulses
are sent by the two legitimate users to the untrusted ad-
versary and the post selection is done on the basis of
measurement results of the adversary. The measurement
results of the decoy pulses are used to estimate the error
rate of the single photon pulses.
TGW establish an upper bound on SKGR for non-
repeater-based protocols [18]. Specifically TGW show
that, regardless of the optical power, the SKGR upper
bound,
RTGW = log2
1 + 10−αℓ/10
1− 10−αℓ/10 , (6)
varies solely with channel length ℓ. According to
this bound, any non-repeater-based QKD protocol with
SKGR exceeding RTGW is insecure.
III. EVALUATING VISIBILITY
The QKD protocol depends on sufficient visibility of
multi-photon coincidences between the two parties A
and B separated by distance ℓ who are connected by a
quantum and a classical channel as shown in Fig. 1. Here
N = 1 corresponds to the single swap non-relay setup.
In this section we explain clearly how visibility should be
evaluated for a CES scheme. Although the concepts are
known in the community, our explanation in this section
is valuable because each aspect of the protocol for vis-
ibility needs to be clear to establish the QKD protocol
based on CES and to determine the protocol’s security.
The coo¨rdinate extending from A at the origin to B
is denoted x. To achieve long-distance QKD, alternat-
ing, periodically-spaced PDC sources and measurement
stations enable concatenated entanglement swapping so
that A and B can achieve shared entanglement despite
photon losses en route.
FIG. 1: Two parties A and B, separated by length ℓ, are con-
nected by two channels: one quantum and the other classical.
Alternating parametric down conversion (PDC) sources  and
measurement stations ⋄ periodically adjoin the channels. Two
PDC sources and one measurement station comprise an en-
tanglement swapping setup. For a total of N swapping setups,
for x denoting the spatial coo¨rdinate from A at x = 0 to B at
x = ℓ, measurement stations are located at each x = ζℓ/(2N)
for ζ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N − 1}, and PDC sources are located at
each x = (2ζ + 1)ℓ/2N for ζ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1}. Insets: A
and B each have a polarizing beam splitters (PBS) to split the
incoming beam into separate spatial modes for each polariza-
tion component, and a threshold detector for each of the two
polarizations. B also has constructs a record of measurement
events obtained by A, by all measurement stations, and by
himself. Each measurement station comprises a beam splitter
(BS), two PBSs, and four threshold photon counters.
The quantum channel is a medium, such as an optical
fiber, which is transport to light and allows superposi-
tions of photon number and of polarizations to propa-
gate non-negligible distances. We treat the channel as
having a spatially homogeneous loss rate, and we neglect
decoherence in the polarization basis. The classical chan-
nel allows A and measurement stations to transmit their
measurement results to B so this channel can be oneway.
Each PDC source generates two entangled beams, one
propagating leftward (negative x direction) and the other
propagating rightward (positive x direction). The light
is picked up by a measurement station or by A or by B.
A and each measurement station transmit measurement
results plus a time tag indicating the time of measure-
ment through the classical channel to B, who uses these
data to infer the photon-coincidence visibility V .
Photodetection is achieved by employing threshold
photon counters, which in the ideal case clicks only when
at least one photon arrives and does not click only when
no photon is incident on the counter. A detector click is
sent to B through the classical channel. Due to detector
inefficiency, an incident photon might not cause a click,
and, due to dark counts, the detector might click even if
no signal photon has arrived.
As shown in an inset of Fig. 1, each measurement
station has a beam splitter (BS), which accepts at its
two input ports the leftward beam from the neighboring
PDC source on the right and the rightward beam from
the neighboring PDC source on the left. The two out-
put beams are each directed to a polarizing beam split-
ter (PBS) to separate the two polarizations into distinct
4spatial modes, and these spatial modes are directed to
four separate threshold photon counters: two detectors
on each side (left and right) to register photons in the
horizontal (H) and vertical (V) polarizations.
Also shown in the insets of Fig. 1, A has a single incom-
ing beam from the right, which she splits into two using
a PBS and sends to two detectors. B has the same set-up
as A but additionally keeps a record of measurement data
transmitted to him by A and each measurement station.
One or more detectors at a measurement station can
click at any time. When at least one detector clicks on
each side (left and right), the measurement station trans-
mits to B the time of the click and a binary signal indi-
cating which detectors clicked. As the measurement sta-
tion hosts four detectors, and each detector can click or
not click at a given time, eight possible detection events
can occur at any time. As at least one detector on each
side (left and right) must click, then the number of pos-
sible detection events reduces to seven possible recorded
events. The measurement station Thus, transmits to B
the time of the event and which possible outcome oc-
curred.
B collects all results and then creates time bins of short
duration. A detector click is stored as ‘1’ and no click as
‘0’, and the bit is stored in the corresponding time bin.
The results from a station in one time bin Thus, form
a four-bit string with the first two bits allocated for H
and V detectors on the left and the last two for H and V
detectors on the right.
The measurement results from A and B in one time
bin are stored as a two-bit string from H and V detectors.
B post-selects those time bins in which measurement re-
sults from each station are anti correlated, implying a
click in the H detector on left and a click in V on right
and vice versa, which corresponds to string 1010 or 0110.
For these post-selected time bins, represented as lists,
B counts the coincidences in his and A’s bit strings such
that A’s string is 10 and his string is 01 or vice a versa.
The number of all such coincidences is represented by
the quantity ‘max’, as these events correspond to the
maximum coincidences. Minimum coincidences in the
post-selected time bins occur when A’s and B’s strings
are correlated. This correlation implies detection event
10 or 01 at both occurred. The number of all such time
bins is recorded as ‘min’. All the rest of the values in the
time bins are discarded.
B calculates the visibility according to
V =
max−min
max+min
. (7)
Alternatively, instead of discarding events 11 at any
pair of detectors, B could assign randomly either 01
or 10 to each 11 event. The motivation for this proce-
dure is to map higher-dimensional events, due to multi-
photon occurrences, to a lower-dimensional space rather
than just discard higher-dimensional events. This assign-
ment of higher-photon occurrences to lower-photon re-
sults is preferable for security as this procedure enables
the quashing map [21, 22]. A closed-form solution for co-
incidence probability [23] is provided in Appendix A.
IV. QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE AND
KEY-GENERATION RATE
The two figures of merit for QKD are QBER (Q) and
SKGR (R). We begin with a brief account of both as
they relate to BBM92 and PDC-ES-BBM92 protocols.
QBER Q is the ratio of wrong bits to the total number
of bits exchanged between the legitimate users, and Q
can be calculated from V according to [2]
Q =
1− V
2
. (8)
The SKGR R is the ratio of bits retained between the
legitimate users at the end of the QKD procedure to
the bits sent originally and serves as the figure of merit
for achieving successful QKD. This rate depends on two
terms. One is the sifted-key rate Rsif for events corre-
sponding to A and B choosing the same bases.
The second term is the Shor-Preskill bound
RSP = 1− κH2(Q)−H2(Q) (9)
arising from optimal error correction and privacy ampli-
fication [3] with
H2(Q) := −Q log2 Q− (1−Q) log2(1−Q) (10)
being the Shannon entropy. The term κH2 is the lost-bit
rate due to error correction, with κ being the reconcilia-
tion efficiency and κ = 1 for perfect reconciliation. The
SKGR is the product
R = RsifRSP, (11)
which is approximately half the raw SKGR.
For PDC-ES-BBM92, Rsif depends on four factors:
1. each PDC source should successfully emit an en-
tangled pair of photons;
2. the photons from each source should reach the BSM
set up;
3. the BSM should be successful; and
4. the photons created at the two ends of the line must
be detected by A and B.
For perfect reconciliation, κ = 1. The second term
H2 corresponds to key bits lost in privacy amplification.
Above a certain cutoff (co) QBER denoted Qco(κ), the
rate bound RSP and hence the rate R are no longer pos-
itive. From Eq. (9), we can determine that
Qco(κ = 1) = 0.11, Qco(κ = 1.22) = 0.094. (12)
We denote the maximum value of distance for which R
is positive by ℓmax.
5The lower bound of RSP (9) assumes perfect sources.
However, Koashi and Preskill [24] proved that the same
bound is valid for any defect in the source as long as
the defects do not reveal basis choice by legitimate users
to the omnipotent eavesdropper. This assumption holds
even if a third party controls the source.
The rate bound is derived for qubits. In a real-
istic setup, measurements are made on multi-photon
states, which span an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
The squashing techniques enables all measurements to
be reduced to statistically equivalent measurements on
qubits [17].
Through squashing, the incoming signal is first
mapped (squashed) to a two-dimensional Hilbert space
whose physical state is a single-photon polarization. The
measurement is Thus, effectively performed on the single-
qubit Hilbert space. If the detection device is trusted and
fully characterized, then the squashing map can become
part of the eavesdropper’s attack. Therefore, the lower
bound is the same as given by Eq. (9), and all the devia-
tions from perfect two photon source are accommodated
by measuring the QBER [24].
In order to calculate Rsif in Eq. (11), we calculate the
four factors, which comprise raw SKGR for our set up:
1. Each PDC source successfully emits an entangled
pair of photons with probability (χ2)2N ;
2. the photons from each source reach the BSM set
up with probability 10(−αl/40N)4N ;
3. the BSM is successful with probability η2/2
bounded by its maximum value of 1/2 [25] so
the net probability of 2N − 1 successful BSM is
(η2/2)2N−1; and
4. the photons at the two ends reach A and B with
probability η2.
Thus, Rsif is
Rsif =
1
2
(χ2)2N10(−αl/40N)4N (η2/2)2N−1η2. (13)
The sifted-key rate decreases exponentially with increase
in number of stations, N . R is then calculated from
Eq. (11) using Eqs. (9) and (13).
The SKGR for ideal resources, Rideal, is determined by
treating perfect single-photon sources and perfect unit-
efficiency zero-dark-count detectors for which V = 1.
Therefore, RSP = 1 so Eq. (11) shows that the sifted-
key rate, Rsif with η = 1, is the sole contributor to the
SKGR according to
Rideal = Rsif = 2
−2N10−αℓ/10, (14)
which must be less than the TGW bound (6).
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FIG. 2: QBER vs χ: QBER is plotted vs (a) source efficiency
(χ) and (b) distance (ℓ) for N = 1 (dotted curve), N = 2 (dot-
dashed curve) and N = 3 (solid curve). Detector efficiency is
set at η = 0.4 and dark count efficiency is ℘ = 1× 10−5.
V. MAXIMIZING THE KEY RATE
One goal of successful QKD is to maximize R for as
large a distance as possible. We have seen that, in the
case of the PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol, R depends on
various resource parameters.
Most importantly Rsif and RSP depend differently
on χ; whereas Rsif decreases exponentially on decreas-
ing χ, a low value of χ is needed to maximize RSP. Both
factors require low ℘ and high η to be maximized. We
use numerical optimization technique to find the max-
imum value of R, Rmax, as a function of the resource
parameters.
In Subsec. VA, we analyze the dependence of QBER
on PDC source efficiency χ. Then, in Subsec. VB, we ob-
tain Rmax over multiple resource parameters. We present
and plot our numerical results for N = 2 and N = 3 and
compare them with the known results of N = 1. We
also compare our protocol with the decoy-state proto-
col and compare the idealized maximum key rate with
the TGW bound.
6A. Dependence of QBER on resources
QBER depends on V of the setup and hence in turn
depends on all resource parameters. We calculate V [23]
and analyze the dependence on source efficiency χ in
Fig. 2(a) for one, two and three stations, which are la-
beled N = 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In order to maintain
the QBER below Qco, χ needs to be maintained below
0.20 for N = 1, below 0.08 for N = 2 and below 0.05 for
N = 3.
In seeking high R, QBER is not the only influencing
factor. Sifted SKGR Rsif increases for higher values of χ
as shown in Eq. (13). Thus, a tradeoff is needed be-
tween the two rates. To this end, we find optimal χ,
namely χopt, in order to obtain Rmax as described in
Subsec. VB.
Another point of interest is to be able to achieve as long
distance as possible with low QBER. We analyze how Q
varies with distance for different numbers of concatena-
tions. Figure 2(b) shows the variation with distance up
to the threshold Qco of 0.11. To obtain Rmax, Q must
be constrained within the range shown for each selected
distance ℓ.
B. Maximum R
We obtain Rmax for various resource parameters.
These parameters include source brightness χ2, the de-
tector intrinsic efficiency η and detector dark counts, but
we only maximize R over two parameters χ and η as ℘
is constrained (2). The two parts of R, namely Rsif and
RSP, depend in different ways upon χ and η. Whereas
maximizing Rsif requires keeping χ high, maximizing RSP
requires χ to be low. For low χ, dark counts become
more pronounced; hence detector efficiency should be
kept small in order to have low dark count rate.
To obtain Rmax, we employ a multi-dimensional
optimization technique, specifically the quasi-Newton
method, over two parameters. An appropriate initial
point needs to be provided so that the search for Rmax
commences with a positive value of R for each distance.
Prior information about Q obtained in Subsec. VA is
important.
The maximized R obtained after optimizing over the
two parameters χ and η, i.e., determining χopt and ηopt
is shown in Fig. 3(a) for N = 1, N = 2 and N = 3.
The loss coefficient is set at α = 0.25 dB/km, constant
loss at α0 = 4 dB and κ = 1.22 [26]. The optimization
procedure requires calculating R many times, which is
computationally expensive.
We observe a cutoff distance ℓmax ∼ 350 km for
N = 1. For N = 2 is ℓmax ∼ 600 km and, for N = 3,
ℓmax ∼ 850 km. For larger distances, we failed to obtain a
positive value of R despite searching a wide swathe of pa-
rameters χ and η. As can be seen from the plots, N = 3
should only be selected if N = 2 and N = 1 choices for
concatenation fail.
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FIG. 3: Plot of (a) logRmax, (b) χopt and (c) ηopt vs dis-
tance ℓ up to maximum ℓmax for N = 1 (dotted), N = 2
(dot-dashed) and N = 3 (solid) for α = 0.25 dB/km and
α0 = 4 dB. Symbols , • and  represent numerically deter-
mined data points, which are connected by straight lines.
The values for χopt and ηopt that yield Rmax in
Fig. 3(a) are presented in Figs. 3(b,c) for the cases
N = 1, 2, 3. As distance increases, Qco can become small
if χ is also small. However, low values of χ in turn re-
quire use of detectors with low efficiency in order to keep
the dark count rate small. This requirement is also clear
from comparing the slopes of curves for χopt and ηopt.
The optimal χ does not decrease for N = 2 or for N = 3
as rapidly as it does for N = 1.
The maximum R obtained here is far too low for prac-
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FIG. 4: Plot of logRmax for optimal χ for SNSPD with
efficiency 93% and dark count probability 10−9 for N = 1
(dotted) and N = 2 (dot-dashed).
tical purposes. Even for perfect detectors with unit ef-
ficiency and zero dark counts, a low value of χ is re-
quired to keep the QBER below Qco. This condition
yields a maximum value of R corresponding to 1 bit each
10 msec for optimal χopt = 0.2 for a source with repe-
tition rate 100 MHz at zero distance. The correspond-
ing rate for N = 2 is one bit each 27.7 hrs for optimal
choices χ = 0.1. For N = 3 each bit requires waiting on
average a mind boggling three million centuries for opti-
mal choice χ = 0.07. These sobering results emphasize
the need to employ quantum memories [11, 12] or another
protocol to increase R to practical rates, and our theory
serves as an important first step towards such accurate
modeling.
In comparison with our protocol, the measurement-
device-independent (MDI) decoy-state protocol [20]
yields a communication distance of around 367 km with
detector efficiency of 14%. Even for detector efficiency of
93% and dark count probability of 10−6, the achievable
distance is 667km with a PDC source in the middle. For
fair comparison we find the maximized key generation
rate for Superconducting Nanowire Single Photon Detec-
tors (SNSPD) with high detector efficiency 93% and low
dark count rate 10−9 [27], for our PDC-CES-BBM92 pro-
tocol with N = 2 concatenations in Fig. 4. The achiev-
able distance already reaches around 2000km, compared
to around 800 km of MDI-QKD for the same parame-
ters [28]. Though the MDI protocol yields higher key
rates than our PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol and reaches
much larger distance than BB84 protocol, the achievable
distance is much less than that achieved by PDC-CES-
BBM92 protocol. Eventually the low PDC-CES-BBM92
key rate could be mitigated by incorporating quantum
memory in a quantum-repeater setup.
In that case, which is the subject of future work, such
a quantum-repeater-based protocol could be superior to
the decoy-state method for long-distance QKD.
The idealized key rate Rideal (14) for our PDC-CES-
BBM92 protocol for N = 1, 2, 3 for various distances are
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FIG. 5: Logarithmic plot of PDC-CES-BBM92 upper bound
of R for N = 1 (dashed curve), N = 2 (dotted curve), and
N = 3 (dot-dashed) for PDC-CES-BBM92 compared with
the TGW bound (solid curve) for various distances ℓ.
compared with the TGW bound (6) in Fig. 5 with loss
coefficient α = 0.25 db/km. These idealized key rates for
our protocol are below the TGW bound as expected; yet
they are quite close to the TGW bound as well, which
reiterates our earlier perception of necessity of including
quantum memories for any further improvement in R.
Multimode memories tend to compensate for low pair
emission rate and hence lower key generation rate [29]
Although our theory is developed for arbitrarily many
CES stations, the exponentially increasing computa-
tional time with increasing number of concatenations ef-
fectively limits our numerical analysis to N ≤ 3 CES
stations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a long-distance quantum key dis-
tribution protocol that employs concatenated entangle-
ment swapping (CES) using parametric down conver-
sion (PDC) sources. Our model of this PDC-CES-
BBM92 protocol accounts for realistic phenomena includ-
ing multi-pair events, inefficient detectors, dark counts,
and lossy channels. In particular, we have solved numeri-
cally for N = 2 and N = 3 concatenations and compared
these results with known results for the previously solved
N = 1 non-relay entanglement-swapping setup.
Through our model and numerical methods, we have
determined optimal choices of resource parameters in-
cluding source efficiency, detector dark-count rate, and
detector efficiency so that these choices maximize the se-
cret key-generation rate R. We have compared our re-
sults with the popular decoy-state protocol, which is a
promising long-distance QKD protocol. The key rate for
perfect resources in our protocol are compared to the
TGW bound, which is the upper bound for any QKD
protocol not involving quantum memories.
Our results show that secure key distribution distance
8can be increased upto 850 km using only three concate-
nated swapping setup, which exceeds the achievable dis-
tance for the decoy-state protocol. We have found that
for superconducting nanowire detectors the achievable
distance is around 2000 km for N = 2. Hence, low dark
count rates and efficient detectors are desirable to deliver
long-distance quantum communication. However, be-
cause of the probabilistic nature of PDC sources, the key
rates for the PDC-CES-BBM92 protocol are atrociously
low. On the other hand, for perfect resources these key
rates approach closely to the TGW bound so the low rate
is close to the theoretical maximum for non-quantum-
repeater-based protocols. Therefore, quantum memories
are needed to generate higher secret key-generation rates
for probabilistic sources. For fixed distance, visibility is
always higher for fewer relays. Our model provides a
foundation for modeling future setups including all the
resource imperfections, and an important next step is to
construct an accurate model for quantum memories and
quantum repeaters.
Acknowledgments
We thank N. Lu¨tkenhaus and E. Zahedinejad for valu-
able discussions and appreciate financial support from
the 1000 Talent Plan of China and from Alberta Inno-
vates Technology Futures. This research has been en-
abled by the use of computing resources provided by
WestGrid and Compute/Calcul Canada.
Appendix A: Coincidence probability for
PDC-CES-BBM92 setup
As discussed in Sec. III, visibility is calculated from co-
incidence probability. Here we briefly explain the method
to calculate coincidence probability at all 8N detectors.
At each measurement setup in Fig. 1 there is a four-
tuple of detectors, one for each H mode and the other
for each V mode after the incident beam passes through
each PBS. For the sake of simplicity in the calculations,
we represent the four modes as ijkl, with i and j rep-
resenting the number of photons in the H and V modes,
respectively, on the left and k and l representing the num-
ber of photons in the V and H modes, respectively, on
the right of PBS in Fig 1.
The conditional probability of clicks ijkl on ideal de-
tector such that actual detection event is qrst is given by
Baeysian approach [30] as
P (ijkl|qrst) = P (qrst|ijkl)P (ijkl)/P (qrst), (A1)
where conditional probability of no-click at actual detec-
tor when perfect detector (with unit efficiency and zero
dark counts) would have detected i photons is given by
P (q = 0|i) = (1− ℘)[1− 10−(αℓ+α0)/10η(1− ℘)]. (A2)
The conditional probability of click is
P (q = 1|i) = 1− P (q = 0|i). (A3)
The coincidence probability of clicks q′r′s′t′ at the de-
tectors with A and B such that the detectors at the mea-
surement stations give clicks qrst is
Pcoinc =P (q
′r′s′t|qrst)
=
∑
i′j′k′l′,ijkl
P (q′r′s′t′|i′j′k′l′)
∣∣∣Aijkli′j′k′l′ ∣∣∣2
× P (ijkl|qrst), (A4)
where q = {q1q2 . . . q2N−1} is a binary string with each
q = 0 representing a no-click and q = 1 represents a click.
Similar strings for r, s and t exist.
In Eq. (A4),
∣∣∣Aijkli′j′k′l′ ∣∣∣2 is the probability that the per-
fect detectors with A would have detected i′ and j′ pho-
tons and those at B would have detected k′ and l′ after
passing through the polarizer rotators conditioned on de-
tection of ijkl photons at perfect detectors at measure-
ment stations. Here i = (i1i2....i2N−1) for the 2N − 1
four-tuple of detectors, and similar strings pertain for j,
k, and l. Thus, Aijkli′j′k′l′ is [23]
9Aijkli′j′k′l′ =

 N∏
p=1
1√
2ip+jp+kp+lpip!jp!kp!lp!
(tanhχ)ip+jp+kp+lp
cosh4N χ
ip∑
µp=0
jp∑
νp=0
kp∑
κp=0
lp∑
λp=0
(−1)µp+νp
(
ip
µp
)(
jp
νp
)(
kp
κp
)(
lp
λp
)
×
N−1∏
n=1
Ω(µn, λn, iN+n, lN+n)Ω(νnκn, jN+n, kN+n)
√
iN+n!jN+n!kN+n!lN+n!
(
√
2)iN+n+jN+n+kN+n+lN+n
× δiN+n+lN+n,µn+λn+in+1+ln+1−µn+1−λn+1δjN+n+kN+n,νn+κn+jn+1+kn+1−νn+1−κn+1
× (νN + κN )!(j1 + k1 − ν1 − κ1)!
√
j′!k′!
i′!l′!
min[j′,νN+κN ]∑
na=0
min[k′,j1+k1−ν1−κ1]∑
nd=0
(
i tan
α˜
2
)νN+κN+j′−2na
×
(
cos
α˜
2
)i′+j′−2na (
i tan
δ˜
2
)k′+j1+k1−ν1−κ1−2nd (
cos
δ˜
2
)l′+k′−2nd
× (i
′ + j′ − na)!(l′ + k′ − nd)!
na!nd!(j′ − na)!(k′ − nd)!(νN + κN − na)!(j1 + k1 − ν1 − κ1 − nd)!
× δi′+j′,µN+νN+κN+λN δk′+l′,i1+j1+k1+l1−µ1−ν1−κ1−λ1 , (A5)
where α˜ and β˜ are the angles of the polarizer rotators
at A’s and B’s measurement setup, respectively. We have
used the expression
Ω(µn, λn, iN+n, lN+n) =
µn+λn∑
γ=0
(
µn + λn
γ
)
×
(
iN+n + lN+n − µn − λn
iN+n − γ
)
× (−1)µn+λn−γ , (A6)
and the form of Ω(νn, κn, jN+n, kN+n) is analogous.
The closed-form solution for Aijkli′j′k′l′ (A5) provides the
explicit expression for the probability of detecting the i′
and j′ photons at A and the k′ and l′ photons at B,
such that ijkl photons are detected at all intermediate
stations. This expression is used in Eq. (A4) to calculate
the maximum and minimum coincidences in Eq. (7).
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